Military intelligence constitutes one of the "blank spots" in modern Russian history to which historians have devoted increasing attention since the collapse of the Soviet Union. After 1991, a thirst for "the truth" about lesser-known aspects of Russian preparation for war benefited from accessibility to once forbidden materials, spawning a number of studies on Russian and Soviet military intelligence. They have ranged from Mikhail Alekseev's multi-volume work to a semiofficial outline history of Russian external intelligence.
1 The genre has recently (and fashionably) embraced the larger concerns of spetssluzhby, that is, not only intelligence, but also counter-intelligence.
2
With the centenary of 1904-05 now upon us, intelligence preparation for the Russo-Japanese War has increasingly figured in various studies.
3 And, indeed the Russo-Japanese War presents special (Moscow, 1998 (Moscow, -2001 , and E. M. Primakov, et al., eds., Ocherki istorii rossiiskoi vneshnei razvedki, 5 vols. incomplete (Moscow, 1996 -2003 . See also, E. Iu. Sergeev and Ar. A. Ulunian, Ne podlezhit oglasheniiu (Moscow, 1999) . All dates that appear in the main text of this article are rendered according to the Julian calendar, in use by the Russians at the beginning of the twentieth century, and at the time lagging the Gregorian by 13 days. problems for students of military intelligence. These problems include the subject of war imminence, or more precisely, the closely-related issue of surprise, the difficulty of strategic net assessments, especially as they related to the combat readiness and potential strength of a fully mobilized Japanese army, and the vagaries associated with gauging likely enemy intentions. Although histories in the immediate post-1905 period treated these and related problems, coverage often suffered from proximity to the events themselves, from the familiar politics of cover-up, and from a genuine lack of reliable sources. 4 For other reasons, the Soviet period did not lend itself to extensive elucidation of the intelligence picture. 5 The purpose of the following remarks is to provide fresh insight into the above-mentioned fundamental problems on the basis of archival-based research and a mixture of traditional and new materials. The thesis holds that the overall quality of Russian military and naval intelligence about the Japanese was uneven, but probably better than might have been expected, especially with regard to the Japanese navy. However, important situational and structural con-
